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Abstract
Deep neural networks have attained remarkable perfor-
mance when applied to data that comes from the same dis-
tribution as that of the training set, but can significantly
degrade otherwise. Therefore, detecting whether an exam-
ple is out-of-distribution (OoD) is crucial to enable a sys-
tem that can reject such samples or alert users. Recent
works have made significant progress on OoD benchmarks
consisting of small image datasets. However, many recent
methods based on neural networks rely on training or tun-
ing with both in-distribution and out-of-distribution data.
The latter is generally hard to define a-priori, and its selec-
tion can easily bias the learning. We base our work on a
popular method ODIN1 [21], proposing two strategies for
freeing it from the needs of tuning with OoD data, while
improving its OoD detection performance. We specifically
propose to decompose confidence scoring as well as a mod-
ified input pre-processing method. We show that both of
these significantly help in detection performance. Our fur-
ther analysis on a larger scale image dataset shows that the
two types of distribution shifts, specifically semantic shift
and non-semantic shift, present a significant difference in
the difficulty of the problem, providing an analysis of when
ODIN-like strategies do or do not work.
1. Introduction
State-of-the-art machine learning models, specifically
deep neural networks, are generally designed for a static and
closed world. The models are trained under the assumption
that the input distribution at test time will be the same as
the training distribution. In the real world, however, data
distributions shift over time in a complex, dynamic manner.
Even worse, new concepts (e.g. new categories of objects)
can be presented to the model at any time. Such within-
class distribution shift and unseen concepts both may lead to
catastrophic failures since the model still attempts to make
predictions based on its closed-world assumption. These
1ODIN: Out-of-DIstribution detector for Neural networks [21]
failures are therefore often silent in that they do not result
in explicit errors in the model.
The above issue had been formulated as a problem of
detecting whether an input data is from in-distribution (i.e.
the training distribution) or out-of-distribution (i.e. a distri-
bution different from the training distribution) [13]. This
problem has been studied for many years [12] and has been
discussed in several views such as rejection [8, 5], anomaly
detection [1], open set recognition [2], and uncertainty es-
timation [22, 23, 24]. In recent years, a popular neural
network-based baseline is to use the max value of class pos-
terior probabilities output from a softmax classifier, which
can in some cases be a good indicator for distinguishing in-
distribution and out-of-distribution inputs [13].
ODIN [21], based on a trained neural network classifier,
provides two strategies, temperature scaling and input pre-
processing, to make the max class probability a more effec-
tive score for detecting OoD data. Its performance has been
further confirmed by [34], where 15 OoD detection methods
are compared with a less biased evaluation protocol. ODIN
out-performs popular strategies such as MC-Dropout [7],
DeepEnsemble [18], PixelCNN++ [33], and OpenMax [3].
Despite its effectiveness, ODIN has a requirement that it
needs OoD data to tune hyperparameters for both its strate-
gies, leading to a concern that hyperparameters tuned with
one out-of-distribution dataset might not generalize to oth-
ers, discussed in [34]. In fact, other neural network-based
methods [20, 38], which follow the same problem setting,
have a similar requirement. [6, 14] push the idea of utilizing
OoD data further by using a carefully chosen OoD dataset to
regularize the learning of class posteriors so that OoD data
have much lower confidence than in-distribution. Lastly,
[19] uses a generative model to generate out-of-distribution
data around the boundary of the in-distribution for learning.
Although the above works show that learning with OoD
data is effective, the space of OoD data (ex: image pixel
space) is usually too large to be covered, potentially causing
a selection bias for the learning. Some previous works have
done a similar attempt to learn without OoD data, such as
[35], which uses word embeddings for extra supervision,
and [25] which applies metric learning criteria. However,
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Figure 1: The concept of detecting out-of-distribution im-
ages by encouraging neural networks to output scores, h(x)
and g(x), to behave like the decomposed factors in the con-
ditional probability when the close-world assumption din is
explicitly considered. Its elucidation is in Section 3.1. A
small overlap between the green and red histograms means
the x-axis a good scoring function for distinguishing OoD
data from in-distribution. The extent of overlap is usually
measured by AUROC, elaborated in Section 4.1.
both works report performance similar to ODIN, showing
that learning without OoD data is a challenging setting.
In this work, we closely follow the setting of ODIN,
proposing two corresponding strategies for the problem of
learning without OoD data. First, we provide a new prob-
abilistic perspective for decomposing confidence of pre-
dicted class probabilities. We specifically add a variable for
explicitly adopting the closed world assumption, represent-
ing whether the data is in-distribution or not, and discuss its
role in a decomposed conditional probability. Inspired by
the probabilistic view, we use a dividend/divisor structure
for a classifier, which encourages neural networks to behave
similarly to the decomposed confidence effect. The concept
is illustrated in Figure 1, and we note the dividend/divisor
structure is closely related to temperature scaling except
that the scale depends on the input instead of a tuned hy-
perparameter. Second, we build on the input preprocessing
method from ODIN [21] and develop an effective strategy
to tune its perturbation magnitude (which is a hyperparam-
eter of the preprocessing method) with only in-distribution
data.
We then perform extensive evaluations on benchmark
image datasets such as CIFAR10/100, TinyImageNet,
LSUN, SVHN, as well as a larger scale dataset DomainNet,
for investigating the conditions under which the proposed
strategies do or do not work. The results show that the two
strategies can significantly improve upon ODIN, achieving
a performance close to, and in some cases surpassing, state-
of-the-art methods [20] which use out-of-distribution data
for tuning. Lastly, our systematical evaluation with Do-
mainNet reveals the relative difficulties between two types
of distribution shift: semantic shift and non-semantic shift,
which are defined by whether a shift is related to the inclu-
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Figure 2: An example scheme of semantic shift and non-
semantic shift. It is illustrated with DomainNet [31] images.
The setting with two splits (A and B) will be used in our
experiments, where only real-A is the in-distribution data.
sion of new semantic categories.
In summary, the contribution of this paper is three-fold:
• A new perspective of decomposed confidence for mo-
tivating a set of classifier designs that consider the
closed-world assumption.
• A modified input preprocessing method without tuning
on OoD data.
• Comprehensive analysis with experiments under the
setting of learning without OoD data.
2. Background
This work considers the OoD detection setting in clas-
sification problems. We begin with a dataset Din =
{(xi, yi)}Ni=1, denoting in-distribution data xi ∈ Rk and
categorical label yi ∈ {y} = {1..C} for C classes. Din
is generated by sampling from a distribution pin(x, y). We
then have a discriminative model fθ(x) with parameters θ
learned with the in-domain datasetDin, predicting the class
posterior probability p(y|x).
When the learned classifier fθ is deployed in the open
world, it may encounter data drawn from a different distri-
bution pout such that pout 6= pin. Sampling from all pos-
sible distributions pout that might be encountered is gener-
ally intractable especially when the dimension k is large,
such as in the cases of image data. Note also that we can
conceptually categorize the type of differences into non-
semantic shift and semantic shift. Data with non-semantic
shift is drawn from the distribution pout(x, y). Examples
with this shift come from the same object class but are pre-
sented in different forms, such as cartoon or sketch images.
Such shift is also a scenario be widely discussed in the prob-
lem of domain adaptation [30, 31]. In the case of semantic
shift, the data is drawn from a distribution pout(x, y¯) with
{y¯} ∩ {y} = ∅. In other words, the data is from a class not
seen in the training set Din. Figure 2 has an illustration.
The above separation leads to two natural questions that
must be answered for a model to work in an open world:
How can the model avoid making a prediction when en-
countering an input x ∼ pout(x, y¯), or reject a low con-
fidence prediction when x ∼ pout(x, y)? In this work,
we propose to introduce an explicit binary domain variable
d ∈ {din, dout} in order to represent this decision, with
din meaning that the input is x ∼ pin while dout meaning
x  pin (or equivalently x ∼ pout). Note that while gener-
ally the model cannot distinguish between the two cases we
defined, we can still show that both of the questions above
can be answered by estimating this single variable d.
The ultimate goal, then, is to find a scoring function
S(x) which correlates to the domain posterior probability
p(d|x), in that a higher score s from S(x) indicates a higher
probability of p(din|x). The binary decision now can be
made by applying a threshold on s. Selecting such a thresh-
old is subject to the application requirement or the perfor-
mance metric calculation protocol. With the above nota-
tion, we can view the baseline method [13] as a special case
with a specific scoring function SBase(x) = maxy p(y|x),
where p(y|x) is obtained from a standard neural network
classifier fθ trained with cross-entropy loss. However, S(x)
can become a learnable parameterized function, and differ-
ent OoD methods can then be categorized by specific pa-
rameterizations and learning procedures. A key differentia-
tor between methods is whether the parameters are learned
with or without OoD data.
2.1. Related Methods
This section describes the two methods that are the most
related to our work: ODIN [21] and Mahalanobis [20].
These two methods will serve as strong baselines in our
evaluation, especially since Mahalanobis has further been
shown to have significant advantages over ODIN. Note that
both ODIN and Mahalanobis start from a vanilla classifier
fθ trained on Din, then have a scoring function S(x; fθ)
which has extra parameters to be tuned. In their original
work, those parameters are specifically tuned for each OoD
dataset. Here we will describe methods to use them without
tuning on OoD data.
ODIN comprises two strategies: temperature scaling and
input preprocessing. The temperature scaling is applied to
its scoring function, which has fi(x) for the logit of i class:
SODIN (x) = max
i
exp (fi(x)/T )∑C
j=1 exp (fj(x)/T )
(1)
Although ODIN originally involved tuning the hyperpa-
rameter T with out-of-distribution data, it was also shown
that a large T value can generally be preferred, suggesting
that the gain is saturated after 1000 [21]. We follow this
guidance and fix T = 1000 in our experiments.
Mahalanobis comprises two parts as well: Mahalanobis
distance calculation and input preprocessing. The score is
calculated with Mahalanobis distance as follows:
S`Maha(x) = max
i
−(f `(x)− µ`i)TΣ−1` (f `(x)− µ`i),(2)
SMaha(x) =
∑
`
α`S
`
Maha(x) (3)
The f `(x) represents the output features at the `th-layer
of neural networks, while µi and Σ are the class mean
representation and the covariance matrix, correspondingly.
The hyperparameter is α`. In the original method, α` is
regressed with a small validation set containing both in-
distribution and out-of-distribution data. Therefore they
have a set of α` tuned for each OoD dataset. As a result,
for the baseline that does not tune on OoD data we use uni-
form weighting SMaha(x) =
∑
` S
`
Maha(x).
Note that both methods use the input preprocessing strat-
egy, which has a hyperparameter to be tuned. In their
original works, this hyperparameter is tuned for each OoD
dataset as well. Therefore we develop a version that does
not require tuning with out-of-distribution data.
3. Approach
3.1. The Decomposed Confidence
[36, 29, 13] observed that the softmax classifier tends to
output a highly confident prediction, reporting that ”random
Gaussian noise fed into an MNIST image classifier gives
a predicted class probability of 91%”. They attribute this
to the use of the softmax function which is a smooth ap-
proximation of an indicator function, hence tending to give
a spiky distribution instead of a uniform distribution over
classes [13]. We acknowledge this view and further con-
sider it as a limitation in the design of the softmax classifier.
To address this limitation, our inspiration starts from recon-
sidering its outputs, the class posterior probability p(y|x),
which does not consider the domain d at all. In other words,
current methods condition on domain d = din based on the
implicit closed world assumption. Thus, we use our explicit
variable din in the classifier, rewriting it as the quotient of
the joint class-domain probability and the domain probabil-
ity using the rule of conditional probability:
p(y|din,x) = p(y, din|x)
p(din|x) (4)
Equation 4 provides a probabilistic view of why clas-
sifiers tend to be overconfident. Consider an example
x ∼ pout: It is natural to expect that the joint probabil-
ity P (y, din|x) is low (e.g. 0.09) for its maximum value
among C classes. One would also expect its domain prob-
ability p(din|x) is low (e.g. 0.1). Therefore, calculating
p(y|din,x) with Equation 4 gives a high probability (0.9),
demonstrating how overconfidence can result. Based on the
form of Equation 4, we call p(y, din|x) and p(din|x) the
decomposed confidence scores.
One straightforward solution for the above issue is to
learn a classifier to predict the joint probability p(y, din|x)
by having both supervision on class y and domain d. Learn-
ing to predict p(y, din|x) is preferred over p(din|x) be-
cause it can serve both purposes for predicting a class by
arg maxyin p(y, din|x) and rejecting a prediction by thresh-
olding. This idea relates to the work of [14], which adds
an extra loss term to penalize a predicted non-uniform
class probability when an out-of-distribution data is given
to the classifier. However, this strategy requires out-of-
distribution data for regularizing the training.
Without having supervision on domain d (i.e. without
out-of-distribution data), there is no principled way to learn
p(y, din|x) and p(din|x). This situation is similar to unsu-
pervised learning (or self-supervised learning) in that we
need to insert assumptions or prior knowledge about the
task for learning. In our case, we use the dividend/divisor
structure in Equation 4 as the prior knowledge to design the
structure of classifiers, providing classifiers a capacity to
decompose the confidence of class probability.
In the dividend/divisor structure for classifiers, we define
the logit fi(x) for class i, which is the division between two
functions hi(x) and g(x):
fi(x) =
hi(x)
g(x)
, (5)
The quotient fi(x) is then normalized by the exponential
function (i.e. softmax) for outputting a class probability
p(y = i|din,x), which is subject to cross-entropy loss.
With the exponential normalization effect of softmax,
the cross-entropy loss can be minimized in two ways: in-
creasing hi(x) or decreasing g(x). In other words, when
the data is not in the high-density region of in-distribution,
hi(x) may tend towards smaller values. In such case, the
g(x) is encouraged to be small so that the resulting log-
its fi(x) can further minimize the cross-entropy loss. In
the other case when the data is in the high density region,
hi(x) generally can reach a higher value relatively easier,
thus its corresponding g(x) value is less encouraged to go
small. The discussed interaction between hi(x) and g(x)
is the primary driving force to encourage hi(x) to behave
similarly to p(y = i, din|x) and g(x) to behave similarly to
p(din|x), in a way that the distributional overlap between
the scores of OoD and in-distribution data is small, which is
an intrinsic property of p(y, din|x) and p(din|x), illustrated
in Figure 1.
3.1.1 Design Choices
Although the dividend/divisor structure provides a ten-
dency, it does not necessarily guarantee the decomposed
confidence effect to happen. The characteristic of hi(x)
and g(x) can largely affect how likely the decomposition
could happen. Therefore we discuss a set of simple design
choices to investigate whether such decomposition is gen-
erally obtainable.
Specifically we have g(x) = σ(BN(wgfp(x) + bg)),
which uses features fp(x) from the penultimate layer of
neural networks sequentially through another linear layer,
batch normalization (BN , optional for a faster conver-
gence), and a sigmoid function σ. The w and b represent
the learnable weights. For hi(x), we investigate three sim-
ilarity measures, including inner-product (I), negative Eu-
clidean distance (E), and cosine similarity (C) for hIi (x),
hEi (x), and h
C
i (x), correspondingly:
hIi (x) = w
T
i f
p(x) + bi; (6)
hEi (x) = −‖fp(x)−wi‖2; (7)
hCi (x) =
wTi f
p(x)
‖wi‖‖fp(x)‖ (8)
The overall neural network model fθ therefore has two
branches (hi and g) after its penultimate layer (See Fig-
ure 1). At training time, the model calculates the logit
fi followed by the softmax function with cross-entropy
loss on top of it. At testing time, the class predic-
tion can be made by either calculating arg maxi fi(x) or
arg maxi hi(x) (both will give the same predictions). For
out-of-distribution detection, we use the scoring function
SDeConf (x) = maxi hi(x) or g(x).
Note that when hi(x) = hIi (x) and g(x) = 1, this
method reduces to the baseline [13]. We call the three vari-
ants of our method DeConf-I, DeConf-E, and DeConf-C.
For simplicity, the above names represent using hi(x) for
the scores. The use of g(x) will be indicated specifically.
3.1.2 Temperature Scaling
The g(x) in Equation 5 can be immediately viewed as a
learned temperature scaling function discussed in [28] and
a concurrent report [37]. However, our experiment results
strongly suggest that g(x) is more than a scale. The g(x)
achieves an OoD detection performance significantly better
than baselines in many experiments, indicating its poten-
tial in estimating the p(din|x). More importantly, the tem-
perature scaling is generally used as a numerical trick for
learning a better embedding [40], softening the prediction
[15], or calibrating the confidence [9]. Our work provides
a probabilistic view for its effect, indicating such tempera-
ture might relate to how strong a classifier assumes a closed
world as a prior.
3.2. A Modified Input Preprocessing Strategy
This section describes a modified version of the input
preprocessing method proposed in ODIN [21]. The primary
purpose of the modification is making the search of the per-
turbation magnitude  to not rely on out-of-distribution data.
The perturbation of input is given by:
xˆ = x− sign(−∇xS(x)) (9)
In the original method [21] the best value of  is searched
with a half-half mixed validation dataset of Dvalin ∼ pin and
Dvalout ∼ pout over a list of 21 values. The perturbed images
xˆ are fed into the classification model fθ for calculating the
score S(x). The performance of each magnitude is evalu-
ated with the benchmark metric (TNR@TPR95, described
later) and the best one is selected. This process repeats for
each out-of-distribution dataset, and therefore the original
method results in a number of  values equal to the number
of out-of-distribution datasets in the benchmark.
In our method, we search for the ∗ which maximizes the
score S(x) with only the in-distribution validation dataset
Dvalin :
∗ = arg max

∑
x∈Dvalin
S(xˆ) (10)
Our searching criteria is still based on the same observa-
tion made by [21]. They observe that the in-distribution
images tend to have their score s increased more than
the out-of-distribution images when the input perturba-
tion is applied. We therefore use Eq. 10 since we ar-
gue that an  which makes a large score increase for in-
distribution data should be sufficient to create a distinc-
tion in score. Our method also does not even require
class labels although it is available in Dvalin . More im-
portantly, our method selects only one  based on Dvalin
without access to the benchmark performance metric (e.g.
TNR@TPR95), greatly avoiding the hyperparameter from
fitting to a specific benchmark score. Lastly, we perform the
search of  on a much coarser grid, which has only 6 val-
ues: [0.0025, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.08]. Therefore, our
search is much faster. Although overshooting is possible
(e.g. the maximum value is at the middle of two scales in
the grid) due to the coarser grid, it can be mitigated by re-
ducing the found magnitude by one scale (i.e. divide it by
two). This simple strategy consistently gains or maintains
the performance on varied scoring functions, such as SBase,
SDeConf , SODIN , and SMaha.
The method in this section is orthogonal to all the meth-
ods evaluated in this work. For convenience, we will add a
* after the name of other methods to indicate a combination,
for example, Baseline* and DeConf-C*.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental Settings
Overall procedure: In all experiments, we first train a
classifier fθ on an in-distribution training set, then tune the
hyperparameters (e.g. the perturbation magnitude ) on an
in-distribution validation set without using its class labels.
At testing time, the OoD detection scoring function S(x)
calculates the scores s from the outputs of fθ. The scores s
is calculated for both in-distribution validation setDvalin and
out-of-distribution dataset Dout ∼ pout. The scores s are
then sent to a performance metric calculation function. The
above procedure is the same as related works in this line
of research [21, 20, 14, 34, 38, 19], except that we do not
use OoD data for tuning the hyperparameters in the scoring
function S(x).
In-distribution Datasets: We use SVHN [27] and
CIFAR-10/100 images with size 32x32 [17] for the clas-
sification task. Detecting OoD with CIFAR-100 classifier is
generally harder than CIFAR-10 and SVHN, since a larger
amount of classes usually involves a wider range of vari-
ance, and thus it has a higher tendency to treat random data
(e.g. Gaussian noise) as in-distribution. For that reason, we
use CIFAR-100 in our ablation and robustness study.
Out-of-distribution Datasets: We include all the OoD
datasets used in ODIN [21], which are TinyImageNet(crop),
TinyImageNet(resize), LSUN(crop), LSUN(resize), iSUN,
Uniform random images, and Gaussian random images. We
further add SVHN, a colored street numbers image dataset,
to serve as a difficult OoD dataset. The selection is inspired
by the finding in the line of works that uses a generative
model for OoD detection [32, 26, 4]. Those works report
that a generative model of CIFAR-10 assigns higher like-
lihood to SVHN images, indicating a hard case for OoD
detection.
Networks and Training Details: We use DenseNet
[16], ResNet [11], and WideResNet [39] for the classifier
backbone. DenseNet has 100 layers with a growth rate of
12. It is trained with batch size 64 for 300 epochs with
weight decay 0.0001. The ResNet and WideResNet-28-10
are trained with batch size 128 for 200 epochs with weight
decay 0.0005. In both training, the optimizer is SGD with
momentum 0.9, and the learning rate starts with 0.1 and de-
creases by factor 0.1 at 50% and 75% of the training epochs.
Note that we do not apply weight decay for the weights in
the hi(x) function of DeConf classifier since they work as
the centroids for classes, and those weights are initialized
with He-initialization [10]. In the robustness analysis, the
model may be indicated to have an extra regularization. In
such case, we additional apply a dropout rate of 0.7 at the
inputs for the dividend/divisor structure.
Evaluation Metrics: We use the two most widely
adopted metrics in the OoD detection literature. The first
one is the area under the receiver operating characteristic
curve (AUROC), which plots the true positive rate (TPR) of
in-distribution data against the false positive rate (FPR) of
OoD data by varying a threshold. Thus it can be regarded
as an averaged score. The second one is true negative rate
Table 1: Performance of four OoD detection methods. All
methods in the table have no access to OoD data during
training and validation. ODIN* and Mahalanobis* are mod-
ified versions that do not need any OoD data for tuning
(see Section 2.1). The base network used in the table is
DenseNet trained with CIFAR-10/100 (in-distribution data,
or ID). All values are percentages averaged over three runs,
and the best results are indicated in bold. Note that we only
show the most common settings used in literature. The
DeConf-C is selected since it shows the best robustness
in our analysis, but it is not necessary to perform the best
among all DeConf variants. Please see Figure 3 and Figure
4 for the summary. A more comprehensive version of the
table is available in Supplementary.
ID OoD AUROC TNR@TPR95
Baseline / ODIN* / Mahalanobis* / DeConf-C*
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Imagenet(c) 79.0 / 90.5 / 92.4 / 97.6 25.3 / 56.0 / 63.5 / 87.8
Imagenet(r) 76.4 / 91.1 / 96.4 / 98.6 22.3 / 59.4 / 82.0 / 93.3
LSUN(c) 78.6 / 89.9 / 81.2 / 95.3 23.0 / 53.0 / 31.6 / 75.0
LSUN(r) 78.2 / 93.0 / 96.6 / 98.7 23.7 / 64.0 / 82.6 / 93.8
iSUN 76.8 / 91.6 / 96.5 / 98.4 21.5 / 58.4 / 81.2 / 92.5
SVHN 78.1 / 85.6 / 89.9 / 95.9 18.9 / 35.3 / 43.3 / 77.0
Uniform 65.0 / 91.4 / 100. / 99.9 2.95 / 66.1 / 100. / 100.
Gaussian 48.0 / 62.0 / 100. / 99.9 0.06 / 33.3 / 100. / 100.
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Imagenet(c) 92.1 / 88.2 / 96.3 / 98.7 50.0 / 47.8 / 81.2 / 93.4
Imagenet(r) 91.5 / 90.1 / 98.2 / 99.1 47.4 / 51.9 / 90.9 / 95.8
LSUN(c) 93.0 / 91.3 / 92.2 / 98.3 51.8 / 63.5 / 64.2 / 91.5
LSUN(r) 93.9 / 92.9 / 98.2 / 99.4 56.3 / 59.2 / 91.7 / 97.6
iSUN 93.0 / 92.2 / 98.2 / 99.4 52.3 / 57.2 / 90.6 / 97.5
SVHN 88.1 / 89.6 / 98.0 / 98.8 40.5 / 48.7 / 90.6 / 94.0
Uniform 95.4 / 98.9 / 99.9 / 99.9 59.9 / 98.1 / 100. / 100.
Gaussian 94.0 / 98.6 / 100. / 99.9 48.8 / 92.1 / 100. / 100.
at 95% true positive rate (TNR@TPR95), which simulates
an application requirement that the recall of in-distribution
data should be 95%. Having a high TNR under a high
TPR is much more challenging than having a high AU-
ROC score; thus TNR@TPR95 can discern between high-
performing OoD detectors better.
4.2. Results and Discussion
OoD benchmark performance: We show an overall
comparison for methods that train without OoD data in Ta-
ble 1 with 8 OoD benchmark datasets. The ODIN* and Ma-
halanobis* are significantly better than the baseline, while
DeConf-C* still outperforms them with a significant mar-
gin. These results clearly show that learning OoD detection
without OoD data is feasible, and the two methods we pro-
posed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 combined are very effective
for this purpose.
In Table 2 we further compare our results with the orig-
inal ODIN [21] and Mahalanobis [20] methods which are
tuned on each OoD dataset. We refer to the results of
both original methods reported by [20] since it uses the
Table 2: OoD detection with OoD data versus without OoD
data with CIFAR-10/100 for the in-distribution (ID) data.
The values of ODINorig and Mahaorig (abbreviation of
Mahalanobis) are copied from the Mahalanobis paper [20]
which are tuned with OoD data. The values of ODIN*,
Maha*, and DeConf-C* are copied from Table 1 of our pa-
per which do not have any access to OoD data. All methods
in this table use the same DenseNet for the backbone. Note
that the performance with different network backbone may
have a mild difference. For example, Mahaorig performs
slightly better than DeConf-C* with ResNet-34.
ID OoD AUROC TNR@TPR95
ODINorig / Mahaorig/ ODIN* / Maha* / DeConf-C*
C
-1
00
Imagenet(r) 85.2 / 97.4 / 91.1 / 96.4 / 98.6 42.6 / 86.6 / 59.4 / 82.0 / 93.3
LSUN(r) 85.5 / 98.0 / 93.0 / 96.6 / 98.7 41.2 / 91.4 / 64.0 / 82.6 / 93.8
SVHN 93.8 / 97.2 / 85.6 / 89.9 / 95.9 70.6 / 82.5 / 35.3 / 43.3 / 77.0
C
-1
0 Imagenet(r) 98.5 / 98.8 / 90.1 / 98.2 / 99.1 92.4 / 95.0 / 51.9 / 90.9 / 95.8
LSUN(r) 99.2 / 99.3 / 92.9 / 98.2 / 99.4 96.2 / 97.2 / 59.2 / 91.7 / 97.6
SVHN 95.5 / 98.1 / 89.6 / 98.0 / 98.8 86.2 / 90.8 / 48.7 / 90.6 / 94.0
same backbone network, OoD datasets, and metrics to eval-
uate OoD detection performance. In the comparison, we
find our ODIN* and Mahalanobis* perform worse than the
ODINorig and Mahalanobisorig in a major fraction of the
cases. The result is not surprising because the original
methods gain advantage from using OoD data. However,
our DeConf-C* still outperforms the two original methods
in many of the cases. The cross-setting comparison further
supports the effectiveness of the proposed strategies.
Ablation Study: We study the effect of applying De-
Conf and our modified input preprocessing (IPP) strategy
separately. In Figure 3, it shows that both hi(x) and g(x)
from all three variants (I, E, C) of the DeConf strategy help
OoD detection performance with CIFAR-10 and SVHN
classifiers, showing that the concept of DeConf is generally
effective. However, the failure of DeConf-I and g(x) with
the CIFAR-100 classifier in Figure 4a may indicate these
functions have different robustness and scalability, which
we will investigate in the next section. One downside of us-
ing the DeConf strategy is that the accuracy of the classifier
may slightly reduce in the case of CIFAR-100 (See Table
3). This could be a natural consequence of having an alter-
native term, i.e. g(x), in the model to fit the loss function.
This may cause the lack of a high score for hi(x), instead
of assigning a lower score for the data away from the high-
density region of in-distribution data. We see this effect is
reduced and has only a 1% accuracy drop when the extra
regularization (dropout rate 0.7) is applied.
In Figure 5, the results show that tuning the perturba-
tion magnitude with only in-distribution data is an effective
strategy, allowing us to reduce the required supervision for
learning. The supervision here means the binary label for
in/out-of-distribution.
75.4
61.8
(a) CIFAR-10 classifier75.4
61.8
(b) SVHN classifier
Figure 3: An ablation study with three variants in our De-
Conf method (Section 3.1). Plain means g(x) = 1 so that
the dividend/divisor structure is turned off. Each bar in
the figure is averaged with 24 experiments (8 OoD datasets
listed in Table 1 with 3 repeats. Note that we use CIFAR-10
as OoD to replace the SVHN in the case of SVHN classi-
fier). The backbone network is Resnet-34. The plain setting
with inner-product is equivalent to a vanilla Resnet for clas-
sification. Overall, both scores from h(x) and g(x) are sig-
nificant higher than random (AUROC=0.5) and correspond-
ing plain baselines. Supplementary has breakdown results.
(a) CIFAR-100 classifier
(b) CIFAR-100 classifier with extra regularization (dropout 0.7)
Figure 4: An ablation study similar to Figure 3. This fig-
ure shows the performance of DeConf-I and all g(x) are
improved by adding extra regularization.
Robustness Study: This study investigates when the
OoD detection method will or will not work. In Figure 6,
it shows that the number of in-distribution training data can
largely affect the performance of the OoD detector. Ma-
halanobis has the lowest data requirement, but the DeConf
methods generally reach a higher performance in the high
data regime. In Figure 6, we also examine scalability by
varying the number of classes in the in-distribution data. In
this test, DeConf-E* and DeConf-C* show the best scala-
bility. Overall, DeConf-C* is more robust than the other
Figure 5: The OoD detection performance of our input
preprocessing (IPP) strategy, which selects the perturba-
tion magnitude with only in-distribution data. The setting
plain means the IPP is turned off. The in-distribution data
is CIFAR-100. The backbone network is Resnet-34. Each
value is averaged with the results on 8 OoD datasets listed
in Table 1. Each method has its own scoring function S(x)
(See Section 2.1 and 3), causing IPP to perform at varied
levels of performance gain.
two DeConf variants. Lastly, Figure 7 shows that high per-
forming methods such as DeConf-E*, DeConf-C*, and Ma-
halanobis* are not sensitive to the type and depth of neural
networks. Therefore, the number of in-distribution samples
and classes are the main factors that affect OoD detection
performance.
Enhancing the Robustness: The overfitting issue may
be the cause of low OoD detection performance for some of
the DeConf variants and g(x). In Figure 4b, the OoD detec-
tion performance is significantly increased with DeConf-I
and all g(x) when extra regularization (dropout rate 0.7)
is applied. Figure 8 provides further analysis for DeConf-I
and its g(x) by varying the number of samples and classes in
the training data. The performance with extra regularization
is significantly better than the cases without it. Besides, the
performance is also very similar between regularized hi(x)
and g(x), indicating that overfitting is an important issue.
Lastly, we note that the DeConf-E and DeConf-C have a
reduced performance with extra regularization in Figure 4b.
This outcome might be because the dropout generally harms
the distance calculation between centroids and data since
part of the feature is masked. The results indicate that the
design of (I, E, C) might not be optimal for the problem,
leaving room for future work to find a robust pair of hi(x)
and g(x) for the OoD detection problem.
4.3. Semantic Shift versus Non-semantic Shift
One interesting aspect of out-of-distribution data that
has not been explored is the separation of semantic and
non-semantic shift. We therefore use a larger scale im-
age dataset, DomainNet [31], to repeat an evaluation sim-
ilar to Table 1. DomainNet has high-resolution (180x180
to 640x880) images in 345 classes from six different do-
mains. There are four domains in the dataset with class la-
bels available when the experiments were conducted. They
(K)
Figure 6: Robustness analysis of 6 OoD detection meth-
ods. The left figure has classifiers trained on a varied num-
ber of samples in CIFAR-10. The right figure has classi-
fiers trained on a varied number of classes in CIFAR-100.
Each point in the line is an average of the results on 8 OoD
datasets. The backbone network is Resnet-34. Please see
Section 4.2 for a detailed discussion.
Figure 7: Robustness analysis using different neural net-
work backbones. The in-distribution data is CIFAR-100.
Each bar is averaged with the results on 8 OoD datasets.
(K)
Figure 8: Robustness analysis for h(x) and g(x) from
DeConf-I. The + sign represents the model trained with ex-
tra regularization (dropout rate 0.7).
are real, sketch, infograph, and quickdraw, resulting in dif-
ferent types of distribution shifts.
To create subsets with semantic shift, we separate the
classes into two splits. Split A has class indices from 0 to
172, while split B has 173 to 344. Our experiment uses real-
A for in-distribution and has the other subsets for out-of-
distribution. With the definition given in Section 2, real-B
has a semantic shift from real-A, while sketch-A has a non-
semantic shift. Sketch-B therefore has both types of distri-
bution shift. Figure 2 illustrates the setup. The classifier
learned on real-A uses a Resnet-34 backbone. Its training
setting is described in Section 4.1 except that the networks
are trained for 100 epochs with initial learning rate of 0.01,
and the images are center-cropped and resized to 224x224
in this experiment.
The results in Table 4 reveal two interesting trends. The
first one is that the OoD datasets with both types of distri-
bution shifts are easier to detect, followed by non-semantic
Table 3: The in-domain classification accuracy. The ”+”
means that the classifier is trained with extra regularization
(dropout rate 0.7). The expanded version of this table is
available in Supplementary.
Classifier Model Baseline DeConf-I DeConf-E DeConf-C
CIFAR-10 DenseNet 95.2±0.1 94.9±0.1 95.0±0.1 95.0±0.1
CIFAR-100 DenseNet 77.0±0.2 75.8±0.4 76.4±0.1 75.9±0.1
SVHN ResNet34 96.9±0.1 96.8±0.1 96.5±0.1 96.7±0.1
CIFAR-10 ResNet34 95.2±0.1 95.0±0.1 94.9±0.1 95.1±0.1
CIFAR-100 ResNet34 78.5±0.2 76.0±0.1 76.2±0.1 75.8±0.2
CIFAR-100+ ResNet34 78.2±0.1 77.4±0.3 77.2±0.3 77.2±0.1
DomainNet
(Real-A)
ResNet34 73.6±0.1 73.0±0.1 73.4±1.5 72.2±0.5
Table 4: Performance of four OoD detection methods us-
ing DomainNet. The in-distribution is the real-A subset.
Each value is averaged over three runs. The type of distribu-
tion shift presents a trend of difficulty to the OoD detection
problem: Semantic shift (S) > Non-semantic shift (NS) >
Semantic + Non-semantic shift.
OOD Shift AUROC TNR@TPR95
S NS Baseline / ODIN* / Maha* / DeConf-C*
real-B X 75.1 / 69.9 / 53.6 / 69.8 15.3 / 15.4 / 5.09 / 14.0
sketch-A X 75.5 / 80.7 / 59.5 / 84.5 20.1 / 31.2 / 7.30 / 37.5
sketch-B X X 81.8 / 85.7 / 60.4 / 89.1 25.2 / 36.8 / 7.55 / 44.1
infograph-A X 79.6 / 82.7 / 81.5 / 89.0 23.5 / 27.8 / 21.6 / 45.4
infograph-B X X 82.1 / 85.3 / 80.9 / 90.9 24.8 / 31.7 / 21.9 / 49.6
quickdraw-A X 78.8 / 96.4 / 67.4 / 96.9 21.1 / 79.9 / 3.38 / 83.1
quickdraw-B X X 80.5 / 96.9 / 66.1 / 97.4 22.1 / 83.6 / 2.38 / 86.6
Uniform X X 54.7 / 75.6 / 99.8 / 99.3 1.65 / 5.37 / 100. / 100.
Gaussian X X 71.3 / 95.5 / 99.9 / 99.4 0.64 / 46.9 / 100. / 100.
shift. The semantic shift turns out to be the hardest one
to detect. The second observation is the failure of Maha-
lanobis*. In most cases it is even worse than Baseline,
except detecting random noise. In contrast, ODIN* has
performance gain in most of the cases, but has less gain
with random noise. Our DeConf-C* still performs the best,
showing that its robustness and scalability is capable of han-
dling a more realistic problem setting, although there is still
large room for improvement.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose two strategies, the decomposed
confidence and the modified input preprocessing. These
two simple modifications to ODIN lead to a significant
change in the paradigm, which does not need OoD data for
tuning the method. Our comprehensive analysis shows that
our strategies are effective and even better in several cases
than the methods tuned for each OoD dataset. Our further
analysis using a larger scale image dataset shows that the
data with only semantic shift is harder to detect, pointing
out a challenge for future works to address.
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Supplementary
(a) Ground-truth ID and OoD (b) ID (CIFAR-10) data distribution
(c)
OoD
Score scale
ID
(e)(d)
Figure 9: Visualization of the score distribution. The data are visualized with t-SNE using the features from the penultimate
layer of the neural networks. The results are from DeConf-I with ResNet-34. The figure (a) visualizes the ground-truth
in-distribution (ID, red, CIFAR-10) and out-of-distribution (OoD, black, Imagenet-resized) data. The colors in (b) represent
different classes of CIFAR-10. The scores are obtained from (c) h function, (d) g function, or (e) the logits, and the scores are
linearly re-scaled to between zero and one for visualization. The figure presents two phenomena. The first is that the OoD
data in (e) have high scores. It is related to the overconfident effect discussed with equation 4. The second phenomenon is
that high-score data in (c) and (d) are more significantly clustered in each class of CIFAR-10. It shows a tendency that the
in-distribution data in high-density regions have higher scores than those in low-density regions (close to OoD data). This
phenomenon is related to the discussion at the end of section 3.1.
Table 5: Performance of six OOD detection methods on 8 benchmark datasets. This is a full version of Table 1 in the
main paper, which uses DenseNet for the backbone networks. All DeConf results are from the h(x) branch. The value in
parentheses is the standard deviation.
ID OOD AUROC
Baseline / ODIN* / Maha* / DeConf-I* / DeConf-E* / DeConf-C*
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Imagenet(c) 79.0(2.2) /90.5(1.1) /92.4(0.3) /84.4(2.3) /95.1(0.5) /97.6(0.2)
Imagenet(r) 76.4(3.2) /91.1(1.3) /96.4(0.2) /81.2(3.6) /97.4(0.3) /98.6(0.2)
LSUN(c) 78.6(1.1) /89.9(0.5) /81.2(0.6) /91.7(0.3) /90.1(0.3) /95.3(0.4)
LSUN(r) 78.2(2.4) /93.0(0.8) /96.6(0.2) /84.1(2.1) /97.8(0.2) /98.7(0.0)
iSUN 76.8(2.7) /91.6(1.1) /96.5(0.2) /82.1(2.9) /97.4(0.2) /98.4(0.0)
SVHN 78.1(3.5) /85.6(0.0) /89.9(0.2) /89.7(0.4) /94.0(0.6) /95.9(0.7)
Uniform 65.0(22.) /91.4(10.) /100.(0.0) /48.5(16.) /99.9(0.0) /99.9(0.0)
Gaussian 48.0(28.) /62.0(38.) /100.(0.0) /6.79(4.9) /99.9(0.0) /99.9(0.0)
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Imagenet(c) 92.1(1.0) /88.2(4.2) /96.3(0.1) /98.2(0.0) /98.0(0.2) /98.7(0.1)
Imagenet(r) 91.5(1.4) /90.1(4.1) /98.2(0.0) /98.4(0.0) /98.2(0.2) /99.1(0.1)
LSUN(c) 93.0(0.5) /91.3(2.0) /92.2(0.4) /98.4(0.0) /98.6(0.2) /98.3(0.2)
LSUN(r) 93.9(0.4) /92.9(2.9) /98.2(0.0) /98.6(0.0) /98.8(0.0) /99.4(0.1)
iSUN 93.0(0.7) /92.2(3.4) /98.2(0.0) /98.6(0.0) /98.8(0.0) /99.4(0.0)
SVHN 88.1(4.8) /89.6(0.3) /98.0(0.3) /98.2(0.2) /98.4(0.6) /98.8(0.1)
Uniform 95.4(0.7) /98.9(0.7) /99.9(0.0) /99.2(0.5) /99.9(0.0) /99.9(0.0)
Gaussian 94.0(2.9) /98.6(1.7) /100.(0.0) /99.1(0.3) /99.9(0.0) /99.9(0.0)
ID OOD TNR@TPR95
Baseline / ODIN* / Maha* / DeConf-I* / DeConf-E* / DeConf-C*
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Imagenet(c) 25.3(2.8) /56.0(3.1) /63.5(2.1) /31.0(3.4) /74.6(2.8) /87.8(1.7)
Imagenet(r) 22.3(3.1) /59.4(3.7) /82.0(1.6) /21.4(4.0) /87.6(1.7) /93.3(1.2)
LSUN(c) 23.0(2.2) /53.0(1.0) /31.6(1.3) /59.6(1.9) /51.0(1.0) /75.0(1.9)
LSUN(r) 23.7(2.5) /64.0(3.0) /82.6(1.8) /21.1(3.3) /89.8(1.5) /93.8(0.3)
iSUN 21.5(2.8) /58.4(4.1) /81.2(1.4) /17.6(3.3) /87.3(1.2) /92.5(0.2)
SVHN 18.9(4.9) /35.3(2.9) /43.3(2.7) /52.0(0.6) /67.1(3.4) /77.0(5.0)
Uniform 2.95(4.1) /66.1(46.) /100.(0.0) /0.0(0.0) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0)
Gaussian 0.06(0.0) /33.3(47.) /100.(0.0) /0.0(0.0) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0)
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Imagenet(c) 50.0(2.8) /47.8(15.) /81.2(0.8) /92.0(0.2) /90.1(1.5) /93.4(1.2)
Imagenet(r) 47.4(4.4) /51.9(16.) /90.9(0.5) /93.6(0.2) /91.7(1.6) /95.8(0.9)
LSUN(c) 51.8(3.1) /63.5(7.8) /64.2(0.6) /92.5(0.4) /93.3(1.5) /91.5(1.2)
LSUN(r) 56.3(3.6) /59.2(18.) /91.7(0.3) /94.9(0.2) /95.7(0.1) /97.6(0.5)
iSUN 52.3(3.6) /57.2(18.) /90.6(0.7) /94.6(0.3) /95.4(0.2) /97.5(0.3)
SVHN 40.5(6.9) /48.7(3.2) /90.6(1.7) /91.4(1.1) /92.1(3.4) /94.0(0.6)
Uniform 59.9(12.) /98.1(2.6) /100.(0.0) /99.9(0.0) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0)
Gaussian 48.8(26.) /92.1(11.) /100.(0.0) /99.9(0.0) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0)
Table 6: Performance of six OOD detection methods on 8 benchmark datasets. The experiment here is the same as Table 1
but use Resnet-34 for the backbone network. All DeConf results are from the h(x) branch. The value in parentheses is the
standard deviation.
ID OOD AUROC
Baseline / ODIN* / Maha* / DeConf-I* / DeConf-E* / DeConf-C*
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Imagenet(c) 78.9(0.1) /84.8(0.6) /93.4(0.3) /88.2(0.6) /95.2(0.6) /95.3(0.6)
Imagenet(r) 75.1(0.8) /85.7(0.2) /96.3(0.1) /84.6(1.0) /97.0(0.4) /95.9(0.7)
LSUN(c) 78.8(0.6) /80.3(1.3) /79.8(0.3) /93.8(0.3) /92.6(0.2) /93.8(0.3)
LSUN(r) 76.2(1.4) /86.6(0.8) /96.3(0.2) /85.9(1.8) /97.0(0.7) /96.1(0.5)
iSUN 75.2(1.4) /85.9(0.8) /95.8(0.2) /84.7(1.4) /96.6(0.6) /95.7(0.5)
SVHN 75.1(2.5) /80.2(2.0) /80.9(1.1) /89.2(2.6) /93.8(0.8) /93.2(1.1)
Uniform 69.0(13.) /96.7(2.5) /100.(0.0) /79.3(8.3) /99.9(0.0) /99.9(0.0)
Gaussian 51.5(1.8) /93.7(1.7) /99.9(0.0) /60.8(23.) /99.9(0.0) /99.9(0.0)
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Imagenet(c) 90.0(0.9) /81.2(2.4) /94.2(0.1) /98.2(0.2) /98.2(0.1) /96.0(0.2)
Imagenet(r) 87.3(1.3) /81.1(2.9) /96.5(0.1) /98.1(0.3) /98.1(0.3) /96.1(0.5)
LSUN(c) 92.0(1.7) /77.9(4.6) /87.7(0.2) /98.8(0.1) /98.5(0.0) /97.2(0.1)
LSUN(r) 91.6(1.2) /88.5(2.0) /97.2(0.1) /98.9(0.2) /99.0(0.1) /98.0(0.1)
iSUN 90.1(1.4) /86.1(2.5) /96.5(0.2) /98.8(0.2) /98.9(0.1) /97.6(0.1)
SVHN 87.7(2.4) /63.9(4.3) /87.8(1.6) /96.8(0.4) /96.1(1.4) /97.8(0.3)
Uniform 85.9(10.) /93.3(4.5) /99.9(0.0) /99.6(0.1) /99.9(0.0) /99.9(0.0)
Gaussian 89.9(10.) /97.1(2.0) /99.9(0.0) /99.7(0.0) /99.9(0.0) /99.9(0.0)
ID OOD TNR@TPR95
Baseline / ODIN* / Maha* / DeConf-I* / DeConf-E* / DeConf-C*
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Imagenet(c) 24.1(0.6) /44.0(2.2) /68.2(1.4) /42.6(2.7) /73.4(3.7) /72.6(3.7)
Imagenet(r) 19.4(0.1) /45.5(1.4) /82.6(0.8) /30.4(3.0) /84.3(2.7) /76.5(3.8)
LSUN(c) 21.9(0.4) /34.8(2.4) /27.7(1.4) /66.1(2.2) /59.7(0.7) /65.7(2.3)
LSUN(r) 19.8(1.6) /48.2(3.0) /81.8(1.4) /29.4(5.2) /84.6(4.0) /76.8(3.3)
iSUN 17.7(0.5) /45.3(2.8) /80.4(0.8) /27.1(4.3) /83.0(3.1) /75.3(3.3)
SVHN 16.6(1.5) /27.5(5.0) /25.7(2.6) /43.7(10.) /60.8(5.3) /55.1(7.1)
Uniform 5.63(7.0) /76.4(27.) /100.(0.0) /4.11(5.8) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0)
Gaussian 0.0(0.0) /46.6(20.) /100.(0.0) /0.06(0.0) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0)
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Imagenet(c) 54.6(2.6) /53.7(3.1) /74.6(0.6) /90.8(1.5) /91.1(0.9) /81.1(1.7)
Imagenet(r) 48.3(3.2) /53.1(4.3) /85.1(0.6) /90.5(1.8) /90.8(1.8) /81.4(2.4)
LSUN(c) 59.9(4.7) /50.9(6.1) /53.6(1.0) /93.9(0.5) /92.4(0.5) /87.3(1.0)
LSUN(r) 57.5(4.4) /68.1(4.2) /87.4(0.8) /95.8(1.0) /96.0(0.7) /90.9(0.9)
iSUN 53.7(3.8) /62.8(5.0) /84.6(0.9) /95.1(1.0) /95.3(0.5) /88.8(1.1)
SVHN 44.5(8.1) /29.7(6.2) /46.2(4.8) /84.5(2.5) /78.8(7.6) /89.5(2.1)
Uniform 27.9(20.) /74.5(20.) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0)
Gaussian 52.7(40.) /87.1(9.3) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0) /100.(0.0)
Table 7: The AUROC of individual experimental setting in Figures 3 and 4 . The experiments do not use input preprocessing.
All values are percentages averaged over three runs, and the value in parentheses is the standard deviation. The ”+” means
that the classifier is trained with extra regularization (dropout rate 0.7).
ID OoD Plain-I DeConf-I-h(x) DeConf-I-g(x) Plain-E DeConf-E-h(x) DeConf-E-g(x) Plain-C DeConf-C-h(x) DeConf-C-g(x)
SV
H
N
Imagenet(c) 92.8(1.0) 98.7(0.1) 98.4(0.0) 92.9(0.8) 96.2(0.4) 97.2(0.7) 60.3(1.4) 93.9(0.4) 91.3(6.0)
Imagenet(r) 92.4(0.8) 98.7(0.1) 98.4(0.0) 93.0(0.6) 96.1(0.4) 97.0(0.9) 63.9(1.5) 93.5(0.7) 90.8(6.0)
LSUN(c) 91.0(0.6) 98.0(0.2) 97.5(0.5) 92.0(0.6) 95.0(0.1) 95.5(0.4) 51.9(0.3) 93.1(0.3) 92.4(5.8)
LSUN(r) 91.3(1.0) 98.4(0.2) 98.3(0.3) 92.1(0.7) 95.5(0.7) 96.7(1.1) 61.4(1.6) 92.0(0.7) 90.6(5.8)
iSUN 91.5(0.9) 98.6(0.1) 98.5(0.2) 92.4(0.8) 95.8(0.6) 96.7(1.1) 60.9(1.6) 93.1(0.8) 91.3(5.8)
CIFAR10 91.4(0.7) 98.4(0.1) 98.0(0.0) 92.6(0.5) 95.6(0.4) 96.9(0.5) 63.1(1.7) 93.3(0.6) 89.5(5.8)
CIFAR100 91.3(0.4) 98.1(0.1) 97.3(0.1) 92.5(0.5) 95.0(0.5) 96.3(0.6) 64.0(1.6) 93.0(0.5) 88.5(6.1)
Uniform 93.7(1.6) 98.7(0.2) 98.6(0.3) 93.0(0.7) 94.8(0.9) 93.9(1.8) 64.6(2.4) 95.1(1.6) 90.1(6.4)
Gaussian 94.4(1.3) 98.8(0.2) 98.7(0.3) 93.6(0.3) 95.6(0.6) 95.4(1.6) 66.5(3.4) 95.1(1.4) 90.3(6.5)
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Imagenet(c) 90.0(0.9) 97.7(0.4) 96.6(0.7) 92.3(0.4) 97.4(0.2) 96.6(0.7) 74.3(2.9) 96.4(0.3) 87.3(10.)
Imagenet(r) 87.3(1.3) 96.9(0.6) 95.5(1.0) 91.2(0.3) 96.8(0.4) 95.4(1.4) 71.7(3.1) 95.6(0.5) 86.0(12.)
LSUN(c) 92.0(1.7) 99.0(0.0) 98.8(0.0) 93.7(0.5) 98.7(0.0) 98.7(0.1) 79.9(3.1) 98.4(0.0) 92.0(5.7)
LSUN(r) 91.6(1.2) 98.2(0.4) 96.1(1.2) 93.5(0.3) 98.1(0.1) 95.8(1.3) 72.8(2.9) 97.6(0.2) 85.2(14.)
iSUN 90.1(1.4) 98.0(0.4) 96.2(1.1) 92.9(0.4) 97.9(0.1) 96.0(1.2) 71.0(3.7) 97.3(0.3) 86.0(13.)
SVHN 87.7(2.4) 98.3(0.4) 99.3(0.3) 91.7(0.7) 97.5(0.8) 99.0(0.3) 80.6(5.1) 98.6(0.5) 92.5(4.3)
Uniform 85.9(10.) 93.5(1.0) 97.7(1.6) 88.6(2.5) 99.2(0.6) 93.3(9.0) 75.1(14.) 99.6(0.1) 87.2(5.2)
Gaussian 89.9(10.) 94.6(1.4) 98.3(0.9) 89.6(5.1) 99.2(0.5) 88.6(15.) 77.8(3.4) 99.6(0.2) 85.1(1.5)
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Imagenet(c) 78.9(0.1) 83.2(0.6) 63.7(6.6) 76.0(1.5) 93.4(0.7) 57.0(11.) 64.6(0.3) 92.6(0.8) 46.3(10.)
Imagenet(r) 75.1(0.8) 76.6(1.4) 50.1(9.1) 72.0(1.8) 95.5(0.6) 46.6(15.) 61.8(1.5) 91.8(1.1) 51.3(14.)
LSUN(c) 78.8(0.6) 91.3(0.5) 85.7(1.4) 77.5(0.3) 90.1(0.6) 78.1(3.0) 60.5(1.0) 93.3(0.7) 35.6(1.4)
LSUN(r) 76.2(1.4) 78.4(2.5) 46.0(10.) 71.3(0.7) 95.5(0.8) 43.0(14.) 64.1(1.8) 92.0(0.7) 44.6(12.)
iSUN 75.2(1.4) 76.6(2.0) 45.7(10.) 71.4(1.1) 95.2(0.7) 40.0(15.) 61.9(1.9) 91.6(0.8) 45.0(14.)
SVHN 75.1(2.5) 89.6(2.0) 87.9(3.3) 77.5(2.2) 91.5(1.7) 75.3(7.8) 60.0(5.2) 93.6(1.3) 54.3(4.8)
Uniform 69.0(13.) 50.4(11.) 46.8(26.) 84.0(10.) 99.8(0.1) 25.0(17.) 59.2(36.) 99.6(0.1) 97.7(0.8)
Gaussian 51.5(1.8) 31.9(17.) 27.0(19.) 84.8(5.7) 99.9(0.0) 7.75(4.2) 23.5(14.) 99.3(0.3) 99.4(0.4)
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
+
Imagenet(c) 77.0(1.4) 87.0(0.1) 82.1(1.2) 78.2(0.4) 86.8(1.2) 83.1(1.8) 69.4(3.4) 88.3(1.1) 81.6(0.7)
Imagenet(r) 73.7(1.4) 83.8(0.6) 76.5(2.6) 76.3(0.5) 84.3(1.5) 78.0(2.7) 72.4(2.8) 87.0(1.1) 75.4(1.2)
LSUN(c) 77.6(0.5) 89.3(0.5) 89.8(0.8) 76.5(1.1) 90.0(0.3) 90.7(0.7) 55.0(2.3) 86.2(1.3) 89.6(1.1)
LSUN(r) 75.4(2.6) 84.6(1.3) 76.8(1.9) 75.8(2.0) 84.5(0.4) 78.0(2.8) 70.1(3.8) 87.0(2.2) 74.8(2.2)
iSUN 74.5(1.6) 83.6(0.8) 76.2(2.4) 74.9(1.1) 84.0(1.1) 77.7(2.0) 67.9(3.8) 85.7(1.7) 74.5(1.8)
SVHN 72.2(5.9) 83.2(2.9) 81.4(5.2) 74.5(3.4) 86.0(2.6) 83.8(3.4) 67.8(2.4) 86.3(2.7) 84.9(2.2)
Uniform 87.0(1.5) 85.1(6.1) 75.6(14.) 88.7(3.2) 95.0(2.1) 83.6(11.) 60.0(15.) 81.7(14.) 57.3(2.4)
Gaussian 87.1(4.7) 84.2(10.) 81.6(14.) 77.7(4.3) 95.4(4.7) 85.1(10.) 70.0(2.2) 75.9(4.6) 34.9(4.6)
Table 8: The summary of classifiers analyzed in the experiment section. Their in-domain classification accuracy is provided
in the right four columns. The ”+” means that the classifier is trained with extra regularization (dropout rate 0.7).
Classifier Image size #class Model Experiment Baseline DeConf-I DeConf-E DeConf-C
CIFAR-10 32x32 10 DenseNet Table 1,2 95.2±0.1 94.9±0.1 95.0±0.1 95.0±0.1
CIFAR-10 32x32 10 ResNet34 Figure 3 95.2±0.1 95.0±0.1 94.9±0.1 95.1±0.1
SVHN 32x32 10 ResNet34 Figure 3 96.9±0.1 96.8±0.1 96.5±0.1 96.7±0.1
CIFAR-100 32x32 100 DenseNet Table 1,2; Figure 7 77.0±0.2 75.8±0.4 76.4±0.1 75.9±0.1
CIFAR-100 32x32 100 WRN Figure 7 80.8±0.1 78.3±0.1 78.4±0.1 78.4±0.1
CIFAR-100 32x32 100 ResNet50 Figure 7 78.8±0.3 76.4±0.1 76.5±0.3 76.2±0.2
CIFAR-100 32x32 100 ResNet34 Figure 4,5,7 78.5±0.2 76.0±0.1 76.2±0.1 75.8±0.2
CIFAR-100 32x32 100 ResNet18 Figure 7 77.3±0.1 75.2±0.2 75.8±0.1 75.1±0.1
CIFAR-100 32x32 100 ResNet10 Figure 7 75.0±0.1 73.4±0.1 74.2±0.1 73.5±0.1
CIFAR-100+ 32x32 100 ResNet34 Figure 4 78.2±0.1 77.4±0.3 77.2±0.3 77.2±0.1
DomainNet
(Real-A)
180x180 to
640x880
173 ResNet34 Table 3 73.6±0.1 73.0±0.1 73.4±1.5 72.2±0.5
